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JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
COMMENTS
At the annual April-May, 1943, meeting of the Louisiana State
Bar Association in Convention, after Mr. Charles F. Fletchinger,
Chairman of the Committee on Judicial Administration, had read
and discussed the report of that Committee to the Convention,
and after that report had been discussed at length by the mem-
bers, including myself, I offered a resolution approving the rec-
ommendations of the Committee. That resolution was unani-
mously adopted by the Convention. It not only approved the re-
port of the Committee, but the Supreme Court of Louisiana was
memorialized by the Convention to "earnestly consider the re-
port of the Committee, suggesting ways and means for improving
the administration of the law in this State, by inaugurating a
system of securing reports and statistical data from the inferior
courts for the use by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
powers inherent in the Supreme Court under the Constitution of
1921, and also by adopting a method for holding judicial confer-
ences, with the object of making effective the Committee's rec-
ommendations in respect to both subjects."
My position now is the same as it was then, and my com-
ment on the Committee's report will be substantially a repetition
of what I said in discussing the report before the Convention.
STATISTICS
The power of the Supreme Court to require the judges of
the inferior courts to furnish statistical information is clear, and
the value of such statistics is obvious.
Such statistics would keep the Supreme Court informed as
to (a) the amount and character of the business being done by
the judges of the several districts, (b) who is earning his pay
and who is not, (c) which judges render decisions promptly, (d)
which judges generally give written reasons for their decisions,
(e) which judges, by their industry and good judgment justify
appellate courts in generally accepting their findings of fact, and
which do not; and much other valuable information.
The contemplated statistical information, if properly compil-
ed and analyzed, would be invaluable to the Supreme Court in
connection with the interchange of judges, and much good would
be accomplished by such interchange. Some of our judges have
very little to do, while many others, because of their crowded
dockets, cannot possibly do their work properly.
I have no fear of any miscarriage of justice resulting from a
properly conducted plan for the interchange of judges, and I be-
lieve that often the quality of justice would be improved there-
1943]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
by. The federal courts have done this very thing for many years,
and I think it is safe to say that the practice has resulted in much
good and, as far as I know, no evils have arisen as a result there-
of. Printed forms that would elicit the proper information could
be prepared so that no great amount of time or effort on the part
of the judges would be required.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCES
The value of judicial conferences surely cannot be doubtful,
but I think that they should be postponed until after the war. If
they are to accomplish their full purpose, attendance should be
made compulsory, and the expenses of the judges in attending
the conferences should be paid.
A free discussion by the judges of their common problems
would undoubtedly greatly improve the administration of jus-
tice; it would make the practice of law more uniform in the sev-
eral districts, and would show some of the judges how very in-
correct some of their practices are. The practice in some districts
is so different from the practice in other districts that a lawyer
never quite feels at home in a district in which he has not pre-
viously tried a case or two, and some of the practices that are
indulged in and that are being enforced are contrary to both the
letter and the spirit of plain and important statutory provisions.
Some of these illegal, unauthorized, and improper practices have
the force and effect of unwritten bureaucratic laws, and may
easily result disastrously to the client of an otherwise well train-
ed lawyer. And the trouble is that there is no way that I know
of to ascertain what these practices are, except by consulting and
taking the word of the courthouse officials who never seem to
understand an attorney's lack of knowledge of these unwritten
traditions. An exaggerated instance of what I mean is the meth-
od employed in the Parish of Orleans in the fixing and paying of
inheritance taxes. Section after section of the State Inheritance
Tax Law, (Act 127 of 1921, as amended) makes it clear that no
one except the judge of a court of competent jurisdiction can fix
and determine the amount of the inheritance taxes, if any, that
are due by the heirs or legatees of a deceased person, and that
it is improper to pay such taxes until the amounts due have been
judicially determined. It is a judicial function. Notwithstanding
this, "it is not the practice" for the judges of the Civil District
Court for the Parish of Orleans to fix inheritance taxes. This
important judicial function, apparently by common consent, has
1. La. Act 127 of 1921, as amended by La. Act 44 of 1922 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 8556-8580].
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been surrendered entirely to the attorney to assist the Inherit-
ance Tax Collector (the Clerk of the Civil District Court in the
Parish of Orleans) and, as a matter of practice, in this court the
attorney for the Inheritance Tax Collector fixes extrajudicially
the amount of the inheritance taxes, and the taxes must be paid
to the Inheritance Tax Collector before the matter may be pre-
sented to the judge. Apparently, after the inheritance taxes have
been fixed by the attorney for the Inheritance Tax Collector and
have been paid to the Inheritance Tax Collector (but not before),
if the attorney for the executor, administrator, or heirs insists
upon it, the judge will fix the amount of the inheritance taxes in
the amounts at which they have already been fixed by the attor-
ney for the Inheritance Tax Collector, if, and only if, his Honor
is ffrst presented with the receipt of the Inheritance Tax Collec-
tor showing that the inheritance taxes in the amounts which you
are presently asking him to fix them have already been paid.
This practice is so well established in that jurisdiction that it is
now like the laws of the Medes and Persians, "which changeth
not." It would probably take a constitutional amendment to in-
terfere with it.
The above described practice and my knowledge with re-
spect thereto, are the result of experience. I was once bold
enough.to open and probate a succession of a right considerable
amount, though very simple in nature, in that jurisdiction. I had
prepared the requisite pleadings to have the inheritance taxes
due by the several legatees fixed and determined so that the same
could be paid and satisfied. I addressed the usual petition to the
court and attached thereto a copy of the will, a copy of the in-
ventory and appraisement, a sworn list of debts, and the written
consent and approval of' the attorney for the Inheritance Tax
Collector and the legatees, and presented myself armed with
these documents to one of the judges of the Civil District Court
and requested that he render a judgment fixing the amount of
the inheritance taxes so that they might be paid, and so that the
legatees might, thereafter, be recognized and sent into possession.
He courteously but dogmatically and firmly told me that "I have
nothing to do with inheritance taxes," and he refused to have
anything to do with my application until I had paid to the Inher-
itance Tax Collector the amount of the inheritance taxes that had
been fixed and determined solely by the attorney to assist the
Inheritance Tax Collector. Having always been lucky, and feel-
ing that nothing would likely happen by following the laws of
the Medes and Persians, and being convinced that the difficulties
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surrounding the attempt to proceed otherwise were more onerous
than the risk involved, I concluded to follow "the practice" and
pay the Inheritance Tax Collector the amounts at which the in-
heritance taxes had been extrajudicially fixed. Having done this,
I then presented to the judge the receipt of the Inheritance Tax
Collector showing the payment of the amounts fixed by the at-
torney for the Inheritance Tax Collector, whereupon the judge
reluctantly rendered a judgment fixing the amount of these taxes
in the amounts at which they had already been fixed by the said
attorney. It was obvious, however, that his Honor did not con-
sider it either necessary or proper for him to fix the inheritance
taxes at all, and that he did so merely as a favor to me, for which
I was very grateful.
It would be most helpful -for our judges in the centers of
population to rub elbows with our judges in the rural districts,
and vice versa. Each of them would learn a lot from each other.
BENJAMIN B. TAYLOR*
The report of the Committee on Judicial Administration sub-
mitted to the Louisiana State Bar Association on April 30, 1943,
reflects the mature thought of the members of this Committee
emanating from many lengthy and considered discussions of the
subject. This committee in its study had the benefit of much re-
search on the question of "Judicial Statistics" and "Judicial Con-
ferences."
Promotion of the efficient administration of justice has been
a matter of great concern to the American Bar1 and has received
the attention of America's leading jurists for many years. That
Louisiana should take a forward step in this move for judicial
reform was noted by this commentator in an address before the
New Orleans Bar Association in 1942, where it was observed:
"At this time, no one is charged with the responsibility of co-
ordinating the work of the various courts. The idle judge is not
assigned to aid in expediting the business of a court whose cal-
endar is congested unless the judge of that court is on leave. The
judge who takes a case under advisement and keeps it, until it
has 'grown whiskers' has no one to account to. No lawyer has
the temerity to wield the statutory club to jar him loose. Article
*Past president of the Baton Rouge Bar Association; member of the
Baton Rouge Bar.
1. At the Chicago meeting of the American Bar Association, Judge John
J. Parker of North Carolina was awarded the American Bar Association
medal for his patient and untiring leadership in this field.
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